

NEWSLETTER

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REHEARSALS



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PREFACE

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Almost everyone agrees that rehearsals enhance battlefield success. Unfortunately, not everyone agrees on what an effective rehearsal is. Consequently, units regularly fail to conduct effective rehearsals during home-station training, on exercises or at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). Often the units that felt they conducted effective rehearsals actually failed in their missions.

Battlefield rehearsals appear at first to be complex. But once practiced, they are simple. Most units wait until arrival at a CTC to earnestly begin rehearsing with all players present.

This newsletter provides combat-relevant lessons to both Light and Heavy forces. These lessons are derived primarily from long-term issues and observations stored in the Army Lessons Learned Management Information System (ALLMIS). The observations were taken from all of the CTCs: the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Chaffee, AR; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, GE.

This newsletter also contains lessons from JUST CAUSE through our execution of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)'s Wartime Army Lessons Learned Program (WALLP).

Rehearals paid off at all levels in operation JUST CAUSE!

These tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are provided for your use and dissemination. If your unit has identified any other combat-relevant lessons, please share them with the rest of the U.S. Army by contacting CALL at AV 552-2132/4455.

TRAINING IS THE BATTLELINK!

JAMES M. LYLE

Brigadier General, USA Deputy Commanding General for Training

REHEARSALS

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SECTION I

REHEARSAL SEQUENCE

A question must be asked up front by the commander. Do I have time for a full-force rehearsal? If so, how do I piece the rehearsal together so that, if either time or the enemy closes, I will have at least provided some form of sychronization?

Orient participants to the training aid and terrain (ideally, rehearsal is done on actual terrain- if not possible, then use similar terrain).

Define the "standard." What will the commander accept as satisfactory performance for the rehearsal?

Verbally to visually "walk through" the concept of operation. All participants must have the commander's intent in mind, to be able to "unleash their own initiative" when necessary.

• Leaders interactively verbalize their elements' actions (not one at a time but synchronized all at the same time).

Focus on key events and timing and achieving desired impact on the enemy.

Consider each enemy course of action.

• Identify contingencies (repositioning or counterattack).

If the standard is not met, rehearse again, time permitting.

Feedback: Ensure changes are updated on the Decision Support Template (DST), possibly:

- Positions
- Timing
- Decision points

At task-force level and above, updating the DST is one of the best immediate benefits of a good rehearsal.

SECTION II

PRINCIPLES OF REHEARSALS

Principle: An accepted or professed rule of action or conduct. A basic law, an axiom, or a doctrine. (The Random House College Dictionary.)

Know the desired outcome of rehearsals and establish rehearsal standards.

An ineffective rehearsal is worse than no rehearsal at all!

Use best technique for time available, whether full force of a unit, or a sand-table exercise. Rehearsals should be conducted in similar conditions of visibility, terrain, and weather as the actual mission. Units must prioritize tasks to be rehearsed, based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T). Finally "War-game" the unexpected and execute contingency plans as well.

Rehearsals confirm/reinforce commander's intent and, therefore, cannot be solely maneuver-oriented.

Consider these principles of rehearsals:

- Conduct the rehearsal and prioritize tasks/events.
- Conduct multiechelon combined arms rehearsals.
- Develop a detailed SOP; determine key participants.
- Tie mission orders to a purpose/an intent.
- Establish high standards and ensure they are met!
- Provide feedback to the commander/unit leader.

Each principle is explained in the following examples:

Conduct the rehearsal and prioritize tasks/events.

Rehearsals at all levels are key to ensuring understanding of the concept of operation, verifying specific responsibilities, timing of actions, and backup procedures to help synchronize unit operations. At all levels, the COMMANDER/UNIT LEADER should conduct the rehearsal. Rehearsals should be as complete as allowed by available TIME. In time-constrained situations, the rehearsal can be abbreviated to focus on only the most critical portions of the operation, as prioritized by the commander. Don't get locked into a chronological mind-set!!!

TTP: Example: If total time available is unknown or open-ended, prioritize. Rehearse actions on objective - then movement to objective - then occupation of attack positions (see below).

METT-T will determine the type or extent of a rehearsal. A good time schedule in the warning order (WO) will identify and assist in the prioritization of tasks to be rehearsed.

Example

Critical Phases/Events/Tasks to be Prioritized (but not in priority)

<u>OFFENSE</u>	<u>DEFENSE</u>
Actions on the objective	Positions
Passage of lines	Trigger points
Breaching	Obstacles
Movement techniques	Counterattack plan
Actions at danger areas	Engagement areas
Actions on enemy contact	Security operations
Resupply	Resupply
Medical evacuation	Medical evacuation
NBC decontamination plan	Direct fire plan
	NBC decontamination plan
	Fire support plan

"My Platoon Sergeant had us work on techniques for room clearing...that saved some lives!!"

193d Inf Bde soldier, Operation JUST CAUSE

Conduct multiechelon combined arms rehearsals.

Allow enough time for subordinates to conduct their own rehearsals. Remember individuals, squads, tanks, and platoons are the main killers on the battlefield. These are the elements that need to conduct full-force rehearsals.

TTP: Example: Squads conduct a "full-force" breaching/battle drill. Concurrently, Bn Cdr, S-3, Co Cdrs, FSO are conducting "reduced-force" TF-level map rehearsal.

WOs issued by higher headquarters must be as specific as possible and analyzed by the receiving headquarters so detailed instructions may be passed to subordinates as soon as possible.

FM 71-1 and FM 71-2 state that WOs have no prescribed format.

Example of a WO format taken from FM 71-2:

Classification

TO:
FROM:
SITUATION:
ATTACHMENTS/DETACHMENTS:
EARLIEST TIME OF MOVE:
NATURE AND TIME OF OPERATION:
TIME/PLACE OPORD ISSUANCE: (Add rehearsal type, location and time here)
ADMINISTRATIVE or LOGISTICAL INFORMATION:

NOTE: TF S-3s in coordination with the S-2 must remember to assign areas for the TF and for the Co's/Tm's rehearsal. This area should provide adequate security from enemy observation (OPSEC), and should replicate as much as possible terrain in the area of operation.

Example

TF Defensive Operation Schedule... Combined arms time usage

	<u>EVENT</u>	RESPONSIBILITY
	Receive Mission	
	Issue a WO	S-3
	Issue a WO	Co/Tm Cdrs
	Situation Up-date Brief	Staff
	Mission Analysis	Staff
PLT	Receive Cdr's Planning Guidance	Cdr
Pre-Cbt	War Game	Staff
Checks	Course of Action (COA) Analysis	Staff
&	COA Decision Brief	Cdr & Staff
Rehears	OPORD Preparation	Staff
	OPORD Reproduction	Ops NCO
	Issue OPORD	Staff
	1st Backbrief to Cdr	Co/Tm Cdrs
	Issue OPORD	Co/Tm Cdrs
	Issue OPORD	PLT Ldrs
**CO	Pre-Position CL V	S-4/Co/Tm Cdrs
Initial	Emplace Target Reference Points	S-3
Rehears	(TRPs)	
	2d Backbrief to Cdr	Unit Ldrs
	Bn Rehearsal	Cdr
	Status of Obstacle Plan to Cdr	Engr Bn
CO	Status of Survivability Positions	Engr Bn
Final	Heat TRPs	All Units
Rehears	Sunset	General Info
	EENT	General Info
	Defend in Sector NLT	
	NetCall	TOC
	Intelligence Update	S-2
	BMNT	
	Pre-Cbt Checks & Rehears **CO Initial Rehears CO Final	Receive Mission Issue a WO Issue a WO Situation Up-date Brief Mission Analysis PLT Receive Cdr's Planning Guidance Pre-Cbt War Game Checks Course of Action (COA) Analysis & COA Decision Brief Rehears OPORD Preparation OPORD Reproduction Issue OPORD Ist Backbrief to Cdr Issue OPORD Issue OPORD **CO Pre-Position CL V Initial Emplace Target Reference Points Rehears (TRPs) 2d Backbrief to Cdr Bn Rehearsal Status of Obstacle Plan to Cdr CO Status of Survivability Positions Final Heat TRPs Rehears Sunset EENT Defend in Sector NLT NetCall Intelligence Update

**NOTE: Conducting the Co's/Tm's initial rehearsal prior to the Bn's rehearsal gives the Co/Tm time to discover any problems with the Bn's plan. The Bn will then have time to react to these problems and, if necessary, make changes to the plan.

Develop a detailed SOP; determine key participants.

Inherent in making the proper decision regarding rehearsals is an assumption that the elements of a task force are familiar with the various techniques, and that the elements have practiced the techniques prior to deployment. Unless the unit has developed detailed SOPs and proficiency in rehearsals during home-station tactical training prior to deployment, rehearsals are doomed to failure. There is not enough time on the actual battlefield to develop rehearsal SOPs and proficiency.

Items which should be included in a rehearsal annex to a unit's tactical SOP:

- a. Who is responsible for making/building the training aid/sand table?
- b. What levels of rehearsals should be established? This would include WHO participates, WHAT type of rehearsal technique, WHERE the rehearsal will occur, or any combination of the above.
 - c. What materials are carried where and by whom?
 - d. Who announces rehearsals by type? When is that done?

Example

Level I: Personnel - Command group, special platoon leaders, primary staff. Technique - sand table. Where - Bn TOC. When - Time.

Level II: Personnel - Bn Cdr, Bn XO, S-3,S-2, Co/Tm Cdrs, FSO, TF Engr, ADA officer. Technique - rock/stick drill. Where - Bn TOC. When - Time.

Level III: Personnel - Bn Cdr, Bn XO, S-3,S-2, Co/Tm Cdrs, FSO, TF Engr, ADA officer. Technique - Map. Where - Bn TOC. When - Time.

Level IV: Personnel - Command group, special platoon leaders, primary staff. Technique - communications. Where - respective CPs.

Regardless of the procedure used to designate rehearsal types, participants, etc., that procedure should be the result of a home-station trial and error refinement. Every time the task force conducts combat maneuver training at any level, the elements participating in that training should also be training in rehearsal techniques. A standard for measuring the effectiveness must be established by the chain of command, and rehearsals should be evaluated and critiqued. Unless an ongoing system of evaluation and feedback exists, training will occur that is not to standard, including rehearsal training.

Tie mission orders to a purpose/an intent.

Mission orders are orders that give subordinates tasks to accomplish without telling them how the tasks should be done; but more importantly, it gives them a reason/purpose why they are doing it. These type orders focus on:

- Task and purpose
- Results
- Absolute essentials

Mission orders require the leader to clearly understand what must be done and how he will do it. He must then be able to express this in clear and concise language to his subordinates. This comes from the ability to use the commander's estimate of the situation, and a mastery of common doctrine and language. Subordinates must be able to understand the orders and exercise personal initiative to achieve he commander's intent.

(FM 7-71, AUG 87)

Mission orders are a product of understanding the commander's intent. If the soldiers of a unit have worked together and know each other, this process is fairly abbreviated. When units/personnel have not worked closely together, game plays/drills, SOPs, and other techniques are used to help reduce the amount of confusion.

REHEARSALS STILL NEED TO BE CONDUCTED, REGARDLESS OF HOW LONG A UNIT HAS WORKED TOGETHER, BECAUSE ---

EVERYONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE COMMANDER'S DEFINITION OF SUCCESS.

"An understanding of the intent of the higher commander is a prerequisite to mission tactics."

"The commander's intent is designed not to restrain, but to unleash a subordinate by giving him greater freedom of action to accomplish the mission."

General John W. Foss, Commander, TRADOC

Establish high standards and ensure they are met.

CROSSING THE SUEZ

The Egyptian forces in October 1973 (Operation BADR) faced a powerful Israeli force in substantial fortress outposts on the east bank of the Suez canal. The Egyptians rehearsed their assault combat teams extensively; a best-case scenario called for the 5-mile crossing to take at least 2 hours. Soldiers rehearsed their applicable section of the plan without knowing when or even where the assault would be launched. A system of colored flags was devised to guide each assault team to its correct sector. Each soldier was briefed on the timing and routing system of his unit and other units crossing with him. A special crossing command was established to manage the entire system. This crossing command had the final authority on all changes of routes or times. Units rehearsed their crossing plans, both day and night. Bridging units practiced erecting bridges until they could meet or exceed the standards established by the crossing plans.

One of the major points to the Egyptian rehearsals, especially critical to the special assault units, was rehearsing in excess of the minimum standard. A special amphibious brigade was formed in January 1972 and given special training. The brigade trained with its amphibious tanks beginning in August 1972. By late October 1972, the brigade held a full-scale exercise and in July 1973, a full capabilities test was conducted. The brigade completed a 20-mile practice night amphibious assault, landed at the designated site and moved inland to accomplish its mission. During the actual assault in October 1973, the brigade was required to cross only 5 miles of water.

A problem discovered during the rehearsals was a sand barrier which faced the assault troops on the east bank of the canal. Explosives experts practiced and practiced but, even with powerfull charges and bulldozers, opening a large enough gap took 5 or 6 hours under fire. As a result, the Egyptian engineers turned to using water cannons pumping water under high pressure to wash away the barrier. After training the teams constantly against similar barriers, the engineers were able to create a massive breach within 2 hours. This innovation was a great surprise to the Israelis. Rehearsals helped identify the problem and helped validate the solution to the problem.

The brigade rehearsed to a higher standard so, when the time for the real assault came, it accomplished its assault mission on October 1973 in a mere 30 minutes.

Provide feedback to the commander/unit leader.

If problems are found during a rehearsal, plans must be developed at all levels that allow incorporation of these changes into mission planning.

SECTION III

TYPES OF REHEARSALS

Rehearsals fall into three types/categories. They are:

Backbrief, Reduced force, Or Full force: There are many different techniques available. All three types, as well as techniques, should be phased along a crawl, walk, and run concept.

1. Backbrief: Backbriefs identity problems and disconnects in execution, but to a lesser degree than a hands-on type of rehearsal. Unfortunately, 38 percent of task forces at the CTCs use backbriefs as their ONLY form of rehearsal. Many commanders do not understand that a backbrief is a type of rehearsal that should be used as frequently as possible, and in conjunction with other rehearsals. One of the best benefits of a backbrief is to clarify commander's intent; however, a backbrief should be combined with a rehearsal technique that involves the physical act of replicating the plan. Do not assume subordinates understand the mission and concept.

Conditions

- · Regardless of the name used, the idea is to increase understanding of Cdr's intent and synchronization through the verbal passing of information.
- The term used here is simply... backbrief.
- · A backbrief is an event that can occur as frequently as necessary.
- · A backbrief is often confused with coordination.
- · Coordination could and should involve the participation of all personnel regardless of rank or position.
- On the other hand, a backbrief is primarily a commander's/leader's tool, and, is at a minimum, used on at least two occasions as in the following two examples:

BACKBRIEF, 1st USE

WHAT. The backbrief is an event that occurs at the OPORD when subordinates repeat to the commander what he wanted them to do and why.

The subordinate company commanders and platoon leaders must identify all specified and implied missions, critical tasks, and give their restated mission. Subordinates should not leave the OPORD until they can accomplish this. Everyone should understand:

- · Mission.
- · Commander's intent.
- · Concept.
- · Their role and timing to complete their tasks.

WHEN. Can be done at any time during or after the OPORD is briefed. Normally conducted after the key leaders have had an opportunity to consider their actions, and what is required.

WHERE. At the orders group location before the subordinates depart.

WHO. All key leaders ..e.g., maneuver commanders as well as logisticians.

BACKBRIEF, 2d USE

WHAT. The 2d backbrief is an event when the subordinate commanders tell the commander how they are going to accomplish the mission.

WHEN. After the subordinate has developed his plan.

WHERE. Ideally at a location overlooking the area of operations. May be at a critical location such as between two COs/TMs on the main avenue of approach.

WHO. The same participants involved in the orders group. At battalion level, normally received by either the S-3 or the Cdr.

Other Backbrief Uses

- · Anytime instruction or planning guidance is given.
- · When new commanders or staff members are assigned.
- · When personnel are tired or fatigued.

2. Reduced force:

Conditions

- · Smaller number of personnel can attend the rehearsal.
- · Units replicate their actions on mockups... sand tables, smaller pieces of terrain than the actual operation.

When time is limited, or the tactical situation does not permit everyone to attend, then the rehearsal is conducted with a reduced force.

TTP: Example: Only the commanders and key staff members, or, at platoon level, only the squad leaders.

Even if time is not limited and everyone can attend, a reduced force rehearsal should be conducted prior to a full-force rehearsal.

REMEMBER, DON'T WASTE THE SOLDIER'S TIME!

3. Full force:

Conditions

- · All personnel are available/can attend.
- · At every level, units replicate as closely as possible their actions, under realistic conditions.

Ideally, a unit would do a simulated combat rehearsal or a force-on-force MILES rehearsal.

Example: A division or brigade river crossing.

When time is available, rehearse in good visibility on open terrain before gradually increasing the realistic conditions. As the rehearsal goes full speed, conduct it with full combat loads in similar conditions of terrain and visibility.

- · For a platoon-size element, all personnel would attend, and all major tasks would be rehearsed.
- · For a larger unit, such as a battalion TF, some tasks may have a reduced force type of rehearsal.

SECTION IV

REHEARSAL TECHNIQUES

There can be many different variations of a technique. A technique is the procedure that, when used, fills the requirement of that particular field of endeavor. Time and enemy are the most critical factors affecting selection of a rehearsal technique. These are but a few:

- 1. <u>Map</u>: May be conducted with a single map with overlays. A map rehearsal will limit the number of participants. Time and space constraints are very limited.
- 2. <u>Radio/Telephone</u>: Used when time and enemy situations do not allow for the gathering of personnel. Used to test radios and determine backup systems in the event of communication equipment failure. Used to rehearse Fire Support matrix and execution of reserve obstacles.

TTP: Example: The light infantry battalion Communications-Electronics Signal Officer (CESO) assembles all radio-telephone operators (RTOs) with their equipment. Communication mechanics are present, operations codes, authentications, encoding/decoding, frequency changes, and antijamming procedures are discussed and then rehearsed. All are briefed on the concept of the operation.

- 3. <u>Sand-table/Terrain Model</u>: Limit participants to key leaders. Normally conducted without vehicles. This technique is used to compensate for lack of sufficient time. Training aids must be built large enough so all personnel will be able to observe. Includes graphic features, such as Phase Lines, Trigger Points, Objectives, TRPs, and may include other items necessary in painting a word picture.
- 4. <u>Rock/Stick Drill</u>: Similar to sand-table/terrain model, the difference is participants either move themselves; rocks, sticks, or anything else to replicate their actions or their unit's actions.
- 5. <u>TEWT</u> (Tactical Exercise without Troops.): Very few assets are required, normally just key leaders. Most effective when used with wheeled vehicles upon key terrain.

REHEARSAL CONTINUUM

Time/Resources	Decreasing		Increasing	
Types	Backbrief	Reduced Force	Full Force	
Techniques Map - Radio/Telephone - Sand table/Terrain - Rock/Stick Drill TEWT				

Remember, these are but a few of the techniques available.

Units involved in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM were able to practice most of these techniques. One of the most beneficial aspects in conducting rehearsals in the desert was the ability of an entire unit to observe the rehearsal--in some cases, up to battalion level. Observing the conduct of a rehearsal allows for a better understanding of distances and timing.

SECTION V

SYNCHRONIZATION

Synchronization is the most difficult element to rehearse on the combined arms battlefield.

GOOD REHEARSAL = SYNCHRONIZATION

Successful combined arms operations are characterized by agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. Of these, one of the most difficult to attain and achieve is synchronization. Different systems available to the commander have different capabilities, and these differing capabilities must be brought to bear to achieve the desired effect. Synchronization is the effective integration of all participants in support of the plan. It is achieved through detailed planning and rehearsals. One technique is to use the reverse planning process.

Another planning technique which supports synchronization is time or event phasing. When performed using a matrix, this planning technique assists the commander in bringing together the various divergent assets available at the proper time. The chance of achieving synchronization without rehearsal, especially in units which have the degree of personnel turbulence experienced in the U.S. Army, is low.

Rehearsals, at all levels, and of all tasks, are essential to ensure that all personnel know what the commander intends to accomplish, and how he intends to accomplish it. Rehearsals provide substance to the bare bones of the written or oral order and provide the foundation upon which effective sychronization is based.

SECTION VI

RENACER PRISON RAID

Perhaps time is the most critical element in determining how long and how detailed a rehearsal should be. Time is always in short supply on the battlefield; thus, many rehearsals end up as short-circuited "walk-throughs", at best, if not merely "talk-throughs." Yet given enough time, a unit can conduct effective rehearsals to the point of each member of the team being fully aware of his individual role and what to do in any number of contingencies. An example of an operation of this type was the recent raid on Renacer Prison during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, 20 December 1989.

Renacer Prison is located south of the town of Gamboa, Panama, alongside the Panama Canal, about 22 miles southeast of Fort Sherman. At the time of JUST CAUSE, the Prison was suspected of housing approximately 60 Prisoners, some from the October 1989-failed coup attempt against Manual Noriega.

SITUATION

<u>Enemy Forces</u>. There were 22 Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) guards at Renacer Prison, commanded by a captain. Reaction forces (police) could be expected from the town of Gamboa in about 20 minutes; in another 2 hours from Balboa, which is next to Panama City. The morale of these troops and police was unknown.

<u>Friendly Forces</u>. The mission to take the Prison was assigned to C Company (-) (the company's mortars were detached for another mission), 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82d Airborne Division. Attached was a team of military police, three UH-1 helicopters, two OH-58 scout helicopters, and a landing craft medium (LCM) from the Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC) where the battalion was undergoing the Jungle Operations Course.

PLANNING

Military sources collected intelligence necessary for the soldiers of TM Charlie to seize and secure the Prison, and release the Prisoners. The troopers practiced loading and unloading both UH-1s and Blackhawk helicopters, since they were not sure which type would be used. Squads practiced extensively on Prison mockups, built with imagination from such items as meals, ready to eat (MRE) cases, and trash cans. The troopers particularly concentrated on techniques for room clearing. Buildings and other hastily constructed mockups on Fort Sherman were used to replicate the Prison compound, U.S. aircraft, and even LCMs.

Assault, support, and security teams practiced each other's roles repeatedly until team compositions were finalized. After the final teams were formed, they drilled even more extensively on their roles. Day and night training occurred on mockups of the Prison. A walk-through was conducted using a terrain model/sand table.

Rehearsals emphasize Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE will always be with us during contingency operations.

The troopers were confident they were as ready as possible. They had war-gamed virtually all contingencies.

PREPARATION

Prior to the operation, the unit was notified it would have UH-1 helicopters, vice UH-60s. The assault force consisted of 22 men who would land in the center of the Prison using two UH-ls. At the same time the assault force landed, the security/blocking force would land in a third UH-1 and occupy positions just north of the Prison and prepare to engage any reaction force from Gamboa or Panama City. The support element, with the company machine guns, would arrive simultaneously via an LCM from the canal side.

EXECUTION

The time and effort put into the rehearsals paid great dividends on the ground when the raid was launched in the early morning hours of 20 December 1989. Although the compound lights went out early-on, and an unanticipated chain-link fence was discovered, the well-drilled teams executed their contingency plans and drove on. The troopers, using their initiative, took their bayonets and cut an entry hole in the fence.

Except for the light and fence problems, the assault went like clockwork. The OH-58s were used for command and control, with one carrying the battalion commander and the other a company sniper. The sniper was used to take out one of the guard towers surrounding the Prison compound. U.S. forces used a loud speaker calling on the PDF to surrender. Casualties were 5 PDF soldiers KIA, 7 PDF WIA, and 10 additional PDF soldiers detained. TM Charlie suffered 2 WIA.

All 65 Prisoners, including two Americans, were secured unharmed. There had been rehearsals, down to individual soldier levels, under realistic combat conditions. This resulted in the mission being accomplished with a minimum of U.S. and PDF casualties.

In this case, the benefits of a good rehearsal under tough realistic conditions were:

- a. Tight fire control.
- b. Virtual elimination of fratricide.
- c. Maneuver elements locations well known.
- d. Information down to every soldier.
- e. Feedback to the unit leaders which resulted in modifications to the plan.
- f. Increased soldier confidence and aggressiveness.
- g. Sense of partnership/ownership in the plan.

The raid on Renacer Prison is an example of a complex, orchestrated through realistic and imaginative rehearsals.

Lastly, once units such as battalion task forces, brigades, and divisions are committed, they would probably do reduced force rehearsals.

...At the end of a rehearsal, each soldier should know his responsibilities and the cues for his actions, and, most importantly, the commander will know whether his plan is adequate....

SECTION VII

NCO CORNER

At the small unit level, the NCO is the person that gets rehearsals accomplished. In the event of limited time, he must work closely with his soldiers and officers to assist in prioritizing what must be accomplished.

Even though formal rehearsals for a mission begin with the receipt of the warning order, in reality, they begin at home station, as part of the unit's individual and combined training program. NCOs are the quality control on any rehearsal standards. They must ensure that crew drills, unit SOPs, and contingencies, are rehearsed under tough combat conditions. If NCOs fail to enforce standards, soldiers are the first to suffer the consequences.

"Sir, it was just like our EDREs back home -- just exactly." **82d Abn Div, Operation JUST CAUSE**

SECTION VIII

SAFETY

Rehearsing as realistically as possible can sometimes be quite dangerous. In the Egyptian crossing of the Suez canal, one Egyptian amphibious brigade lost more soldiers during rehearsals than during the actual crossing operation.

A balance must be achieved between tough realistic training and needless loss of life.

Realistic standards can be met, but all personnel must be able to influence their respective areas and have absolute control over events. This requires detailed leadership involvement at all levels. Remember, everyone is a safety officer.

SECTION IX

TRAINING AIDS AND EXPEDIENTS

Both Light and Heavy units use different types of products to build a training aid; this is primarily based on availability to deploy with items necessary to build a training aid Limitations are the weight of the items, size, and frequency of usage.

Light Units

A Light force may desire to carry the following items to assist in replicating actual terrain and facilities:

- String
- Chalk (various colors)
- Stakes (dual purpose, also aiming)
- Engineer tape
- Miniature vehicle replicas
- Cans of spray paint (various colors)

The key consideration for a Light unit is the ability to carry its essential items in its rucksacks. A system (SOP) should be used to identify personnel down to squad level to carry these items.

Heavy Units

A Heavy unit may desire to carry the same types of products as stated above. In addition, some units have developed a system, whereas the S-3 section uses an old wooden footlocker which it carries in its M-577. The unit should have a standard packing list with enough products for the exercise, and one person designated to keep the footlocker stocked.

The items a unit carries in its footlocker should be the result of home-station trial and error refinement.

Field Expedients

As a general rule of thumb, the only limitation on the use of field The following is only a small sample of some field expedients:

- Chalk on the side of a M-113.
- Cans (small soda type up to, and including, trash).
- Leaves/vegetation.
- Lumber/wood, i.e., limbs, branches, etc.
- MRE cases.
- Cars/vehicles.

SECTION X

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